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THE INFLUENCE OF COCKPIT WEATHER
AUTOMATION ON PILOT PERCEPTION
		 AND DECISION-MAKING IN
			 SEVERE WEATHER CONDITIONS
Kryn M. Ambs
Dr. Philip Tartalone, Mentor
ABSTRACT
This research examines situations in which a pilot either
chooses to use, or refrains from using weather-related automation
systems, and how the presence of such systems influences a pilot’s
decision-making, performance and ability to perceive danger in
severe weather conditions. Results indicate that the influence of
automation on a pilot’s perception and decision-making process is
dependent upon the pilot’s ability to perform manual flight tasks,
independent of the automation. Pilots are more likely to continue
flight into severe weather conditions and less likely to identify
hazardous weather changes when an imbalance exists between a
pilot’s flight experience, confidence in ability to manually operate
the aircraft, and reliance on automation systems.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Reliance on advanced cockpit technologies, more
specifically weather radar systems, has led researchers to
question whether such technologies improve or hinder a pilot’s
decision-making performance and ability to perceive danger in
severe weather conditions. Madhavan and Lacson (2006) state
that “poor pilot decision-making in deteriorating weather is the
leading cause of a significant percentage of fatalities arising from
aviation accidents in the last two decades” (p. 47). Although
an appropriate level of training may have been completed, the
presence of weather automation may enhance or hinder the pilot’s
performance and decision-making process. High-tech cockpits
integrate information quickly and efficiently, decreasing the pilot’s
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workload and the time it takes the pilot to make decisions. Thus,
overreliance on automation, specifically weather automation
systems, may increase erroneous behavior and ultimately lead
to aircraft accidents. This research focuses on the pilot’s reliance
on weather automation, versus the pilot’s ability to perform
without weather automation, when assessing the safety of weather
conditions and determining whether to continue flight. Mosier,
Skitka, Heers, and Burdick (1998) indicated that although pilots
are trained to use the systems of the aircraft, new technologies
are being developed to take on cognitive flight tasks for the pilot.
Concurrently, pilots who use automated weather systems have
shown an overreliance on the data provided by these displays.
These advancements have been proven to have a positive affect
on a pilot’s performance and decision-making process; however,
confusion pertaining to automation and weather displays has also
been documented.
The article Performance Consequences of AutomationInduced Complacency by Parasuraman, Molloy, and Singh (1993)
explained that one form of confusion, known as complacency, is
“one potential negative effect of automation relevant to monitoring performance” (p. 2). Parasuraman, Molloy, and Singh (1993)
go on to explain that:
Crew attitudes such as overconfidence in
automation may not be sufficient in themselves
to lead to complacency, but may only indicate a
potential for complacency. Complacent behavior
may arise only when complacency potential occurs jointly with other conditions such as high
workload brought about by poor weather, heavy
traffic, or fatigue due to poor sleep or long flights.
The combination of the crew’s attitude toward
automation (e.g., overreliance) and a particular
situation (e.g., fatigue) may lead to complacent
behavior. One index of complacent behavior
(among other possibilities) could be reduced accuracy or delay in detecting a failure in the automated control of a flight task. (p. 3)
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It can be determined that certain human factors or flying
conditions (weather, traffic, fatigue, etc.) may cause pilots to rely
more heavily on automated weather systems, in comparison to
situations in which such human factors or conditions do not occur.
Such confidence in weather displays may result in poor monitoring
performance. While relying on the weather systems, pilots may
neglect to monitor the systems for danger, malfunctions, or
failure, which could ultimately lead to an incident or accident. It is
important that an appropriate balance exists between the accuracy
of the pilot’s performance and the reliance upon the accuracy of
the automated weather systems. Muthard and Wickens (2003)
recognize the limitations of some automated weather systems,
noting that pilots were less likely to detect threatening weather
changes and were therefore more likely to continue flying
hazardous routes. They also found that “pilots would seek cues
that confirm the belief that the originally filed flight path was safe
and ignore cues that refute the belief” (Muthard & Wickens, 2003,
p. 858). This is an indication of substantial reliance on weather
automation and deficient information processing. Pilots who rely
on already limited automation are more likely to continue flight
into unsafe conditions, which increases the risk of erroneous
behavior and the possibility of calamity.
In Humans and Automation: Use, Misuse, Disuse, Abuse,
the relationship between pilots and automation is examined and
further defined as the “engaging or disengaging, overreliance, neglect, and omission of consequences of, or pertaining to automation” (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997, p. 230). When automation is
implemented in flight operations, it is important that the system is
easy to operate, responds quickly, and that proper training is received to ensure its appropriate use and to reduce the risk of operator errors (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Parasuraman and Riley
(1997) discuss the importance of the pilot’s ability to recognize
an overreliance on automation and the tendency to use automation cues as heuristics for decisions. They report that “operational
monitoring can be efficient” with favorable ergonomics, steady
workloads, and a counterbalance between pilots and automation
performance (p. 249). Furthermore, an operator’s mistrust of auto-
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mation will decrease when the automation meets standard requirements for function. Equally, automation abuse will decrease when
the operator has responsibilities and capabilities not solely based
on the functions of the automation (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).
Contrarily, a study by Moiser et al. (1998) reported that:
Pilots who reported an internalized perception of
“accountability” for their performance and strategies of interactions with the automation were significantly more likely to double-check automated functioning against other cues and less likely to commit
errors than those who do not share this perception.
Pilots were also likely to erroneously “remember”
the presence of expected cues when describing their
decision-making processes. (p. 47-48)
These studies suggest that although some pilots maintain
a balance between their ability to fly the aircraft and their reliance
on automation, there are pilots who do not maintain this balance,
relying solely on automation to complete cognitive flight tasks.
The imbalance between flight experience and automation reliance
identified in both of these studies documents the influence of automation on pilot perception and decision-making. Based on this
research, the influence of automation can be positive or negative,
depending on the pilot’s ability to assume responsibility for completing cognitive flight tasks, independent of automation. A study
by Wiggins and Bollwerk (2006) suggests that the presence of
automation within the cockpit helps pilots make safe decisions
and perform flight tasks correctly, in accordance with high-risk
situations in which pilots make strategic decisions based on time
and their ability to maintain personal control of the aircraft, as
opposed to completing all flight tasks with a sole reliance on automation. Furthermore, Wiggins and Bollwerk (2006) report that:
(a) Different operators prefer to acquire information using different heuristic-based strategies; (b)
the selection of an information acquisition strategy
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is not predicted by task-related experience; (c) and
the strategy that appears most appealing is also one
that demands a significant amount of time to ensure that sufficient information is acquired prior to
the selection of an alternative. Successful decision
support systems are therefore likely to be those
that enable users to exercise control over their own
individual approach to decision making, and present the required information within a time period
that enable the generation and execution of a response. (p. 745)
Wiggins and Bollwerk’s (2006) study examined pilot
decision-making relative to perception and personal stimuli,
with little dependency on weather automation. Similarly, a
study by Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002) examined pilot
decision-making in severe weather conditions relative to weather
encounters and available weather information. Wiegmann at al.
(2002) reported that pilots who encountered severe weather early
in a flight were more likely to “go take a look,” while pilots who
experienced weather changes later in a flight were more likely
to rely on their senses and personal experience before making a
decision to diverge from their original flight plan. They further
reported that these analyses were a result of situation assessment.
Wiegmann et al. (2002) explained that early weather encounters
influenced pilots to continue flight (or “go take a look”) due to
a contradiction between prior weather briefing information and
automated weather data. Furthermore, later weather encounters
quickly influenced pilots to divert from the original flight plan
due to the lack of accuracy and reliability of the previous weather
briefing information.
O’Hare and Smitheram (1995) report that “one of the most
significant factors in general aviation fatalities is the continuance
of visual flight rules (VFR) flight into deteriorating weather” (p.
351). In “Human Factors Analysis of Accidents Involving Visual
Flight Rules Flight into Adverse Weather,” Goh and Wiegmann
(2002a) hypothesize that “pilots risk pressing on into deteriorat-
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ing weather simply because they do not realize they are doing so”
(p. 817). In this study, Goh and Wiegmann (2002) also hypothesize
that pilots may continue VFR flight into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) when they “are overconfident in their abilities
and do not fully appreciate the risks of flying into adverse weather”
(p. 817). Data support both hypotheses above, where pilots may be
too confident or do not realize the deteriorating weather, ultimately
leading to an incident or accident (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002a, p.
821). Goh and Wiegmann (2002a) report that:
It was found that the median flight hours of pilots
involved in VFR-IMC accidents was significantly lower than that of pilots involved in other types
of GA accidents. Pilots involved in VFR-IMC accidents had less training (certification) and were
less likely to have instrument ratings. Therefore,
these pilots may have less experience interpreting
real-time weather and may make more erroneous
evaluations. (p. 821)
Pilots appear to rely on automation, as well as their own
ability to perceive danger, to complete cognitive flight tasks in
high-risk situations; however, flight experience and familiarity of
the automation significantly affect the outcome of a flight. Further
research has identified how pilots apply decision-making to the
performance of cognitive tasks in weather related situations with
the use of automated weather systems. Latorella and Chamberlain
(2002) evaluate pilots’ notion of tactical (to do, evaluate, maneuver,
and control) and strategic (to plan, think, anticipate, prioritize) planning in severe weather, and report that “pilots need tactical weather
information” (p. 105). Latorella and Chamberlin (2002) report that
“subjects indicated that knowing cell intensities’ (colored graphics),
proximity to weather (cell locations and aircraft location), and having weather radar and observations for alternates and destinations
supported tactical use” (p. 104). This study indicates that although
pilots can operate aircraft without tactical weather-related information from weather radar systems, pilots need such information for
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better performance and safer decision-making. Without weather radar systems in the cockpit, a pilot may evaluate the safety of a flight
using personal stimuli and knowledge to strategically plan a diversion. However, with weather radar systems in the cockpit, a pilot is
able to use both tactical and strategic planning to form a safer flight
plan in critical situations.
A study by Beringer and Ball (2004) examines the effects
of weather automation and direct weather viewing on a pilot’s
perception and decision-making in severe weather. Thirty-two pilots participated in this study, flying a simulator using NEXRAD
weather radar, while visual-performance data, flight-performance
data, and post-flight data were collected. Visual-performance data
correspond to how long the pilots accessed the data; flight-performance data correspond to how close to the weather the pilots
flew, and how long they deferred the decision to continue flight;
post-flight data correspond to the response of the pilots to weather
data, equivalent to that of the simulator in a non-flight environment (Beringer & Ball, 2004). Data showed that:
Physical separation maintained from convective
cells suggests that the pilots with higher resolution NEXRAD imagery or no NEXRAD imagery
tended to fly closer to the convective cells than
is recommended by the AIM (7-1-27). It recommends “avoiding by at least 20 miles any thunderstorm identified as severe or giving an intense radar echo.” Note that 17 (53.2%) of the pilots flew
inside this recommended distance. Additionally,
the AIM (7-1-27) suggests not taking off or landing in the face of an approaching thunderstorm and
to not attempt to fly under the thunderstorm even
if you can see through the other side. However, 7
(21.9%) pilots attempted to fly through or under
the thunderstorm to land. (p. 6)
Their results show that pilots exhibited both an overreliance on weather automation and a deficient professional judgment
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while flying through severe weather conditions. When no weather
automation is present, a pilot may still continue near or through
inclement weather, without indication of the presence or severity
of storm cells. When weather automation with high resolution
(indicating more accuracy) is present, the pilot may opt to continue flight near or through inclement weather. Such reliance on
automated weather systems can be burdensome on the pilot and
may affect the outcome of the flight. Beringer and Ball (2002)
state that “NEXRAD has a number of limitations that most pilots
do not take into account in their usage of the data” (p. 1). Beringer
and Ball (2004) proceed to explain that:
NEXRAD data received in the cockpit are always
time-delayed from the actual observation at least 6
to 7 minutes following the actual radar scan. This
means that an image on a cockpit display may be as
old as 12 to 14 minutes before it is updated. This fact
gives rise to the legitimate concern that pilots might
be trying to make tactical decisions based upon “old”
data. There is also the question of how much degradation is acceptable in the resolution of the data before pilots no longer feel that the displayed image is
representative of the weather phenomena. (p. 1)
This report significantly supports the hypothesis of pilots’ overreliance on weather displays, where both too much and
too little use of these systems can have a negative effect on pilot
performance and the overall safety of flight. A significant amount
of training on weather automation, and the ability to fly without
this automation, could exponentially decrease the number of accidents and incidents that result from severe weather. Concurrently,
a study by Latorella and Chamberlain (2001) examines General
Aviation (GA) pilots’ use of aural, external, and sensor-based avionics to make flight decisions. Latorella and Chamberlain (2001)
identify “out-the-window,” Flight Service Station, Flightwatch,
Air Traffic Control, Stormscope, and Strikefinder as the avionics
used to determine the pilots’ in flight decision-making processes.
In correlation to these weather systems, they note that
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information available from these sources is limited
and, when weather becomes a problem, the frequencies used to obtain this information become saturated,
making this information inaccessible at exactly the
time it is most needed… While these systems show
severe local weather to avoid, they do not provide
the more comprehensive weather picture required to
fully support strategic planning or avoidance maneuvers. More accessible, complete, and usable weather
information would benefit pilots’ situation awareness, decision-making, and safety. (p. 1)
The importance of the presence of weather automation,
as well as pilot input pertaining to both strategic and tactical planning in hazardous conditions, is well documented. While weather
automation does exhibit limitations to the amount and accuracy of
data it provides, in high-risk situations the presence of these automated aids is more helpful than not. However, when the weather
displays are most needed, the data may not be obtainable, which
becomes a limitation to pilots. Furthermore, pilots should not rely
solely on these systems under the assumption that when approaching hazardous weather, the technology will always be available.
Pilots must be trained to operate aircraft, independent of the automated weather systems. The skills required for tactical flight
should be well ingrained into pilot training. If such skills exist for
pilots operating in hazardous weather conditions, the level of risk
and calamity associated with inclement weather can be mitigated.
Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) state that “weather-related
crashes continue to account for a significant proportion of general aviation (GA) accidents …Weather-related crashes are one
of the most common causes of GA fatalities” (p. 305). In their
study, Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) recruited forty pilots, separated
by levels of experience, to be tested on decision-based scenarios,
observing results with indication of information acquisition, performance, decision-making, pilot experience (flight hours), and
confidence. When examining the strategies of pilot information
acquisition, it was determined that “experienced pilots accessed
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significantly fewer information screens, made fewer information recursions and spent relatively less time examining the information screens than inexperienced pilots” (p. 316). Their data
suggest that pilots with more experience rely less on automation
when flying through hazardous weather, while less experienced
pilots rely more heavily on automation to complete flight operations in hazardous weather.
These results reflect the effects automation reliance
has on pilots with lower confidence in performing. When pilots
have low confidence in their ability to perform, they will rely
more heavily on automation, which may not be the best choice.
Inexperienced pilots might not trust automated systems to provide
sufficient information pertaining to the surrounding environment;
they might, however, rely on automation to guide them through
inclement weather because of their uncertainty about their own
ability to perform flight operations safely. Contrarily, more
experienced pilots may be over-confident in their ability to
perform operations with little to no automation, which in certain
weather-related situations may not be the best decision. However,
less reliance upon automation may reflect a positive outcome, as
the more experienced pilots take into account the limits of the
systems and instead choose to apply their own experience in flight
operations.
A balance between the pilots’ confidence in their abilities
to perform, their knowledge and training, and use of automation
must exist to ensure overall flight safety in inclement or deteriorating weather conditions. Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) report that
an “analysis of the decisions indicated that pilots in the intermediate and experienced groups were significantly more likely to continue toward their destinations than to divert. By contrast, pilots in
the inexperienced group chose with greater frequency to return to
the point of take-off” (p. 317). It is important to note that “the decision to return to the point of departure, in most scenarios used, is
ill-advised” (p. 317). Again, the more experienced pilots are more
confident in both their own performance, as well as the uses of automation to complete flight operations, while the less experienced
pilots are not as confident in their ability to complete flight opera-
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tions. This study supports the importance of accurate training and
trust in automation to meet standard operation requirements, and
the effects they can have on decreasing erroneous decision-making, as well as accidents. Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) write that
A qualitative distinction was observed between
both the information search and problem-solving
strategies used by inexperienced and experienced
pilots. This was interpreted as qualified support
for the notion that through task-specific experience, individuals develop procedures that can be
generalized and applied subsequently to a variety
of situations. Quantitative differences were also
observed between the information search strategies of inexperienced and experienced pilots,
with the former accessing a greater number of
information screens; making a greater number of
information recursions; and spending more time
examining the information screens than the latter. Inexperienced pilots also exhibited greater response latency in selecting from a forced choice:
whether to continue to the destination or return to
the point of take-off. (p. 318)
Additionally, the study by Wiggins and O’Hare (1995)
addresses the importance and need for weather-related decisionmaking in pilot training initiatives. “Weather-related decisionmaking (WRDM) can be defined as those skills necessary to recognize and avoid meteorological phenomena that present a hazard
to the flight” (p. 305). WRDM training could provide pilots with
insight on how to take advantage of the weather automation resources within the cockpit to make accurate decisions based on
safety in a timely manner.
A study by Beringer and Schvaneveldt (2002), Priorities
of Weather Information in Various Phases of Flight, reports that 71
pilots (26 experienced, 45 novice) provided questionnaire responses about weather related priorities at different phases of flight. The
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phases of flight observed in the study include preflight planning,
pre-departure, taxi, takeoff, climb, transition to cruise, cruise, inflight planning, descent, approach and landing (p. 87). Additionally,
there were 28 weather factors that included, but were not limited to
rain, hail, snow, turbulence, updrafts, downdrafts, lightning, windshear, clouds, and static atmospheric pressure (p. 87).
Beringer and Schvaneveldt (2002) asked pilots to rate
certain factors between VFR and IFR flight, where “1 = critical and/or frequently accessed, 2 = important and/or usually
accessed, 3 = relevant and/or sometimes accessed, and 4 = not
relevant and/or rarely accessed” (p. 87). Data from this study
indicate that experienced pilots rated weather information as more
important than did the novice pilots. This study aimed to examine
pilot use of weather automation in hazardous weather conditions;
it reported that pilots with more training and flight experience utilized the weather information provided by the automated weather
systems, but also maintained a sense of necessity to perform flight
operations and detect danger, independent of the weather displays.
Beringer and Schvaneveldt (2002) add that, “for pilots to maintain (or quickly attain) good situation awareness, they must have
access to and be aware of these critical information elements,
whether they are actively in control or not” (p. 87).
The Beringer and Schvaneveldt study identifies the
positive effects of automated weather systems on pilot perception
and decision-making in hazardous weather. Weather automation
provides the pilot with crucial information in relation to the
surrounding environment, quickly and efficiently, decreasing
the time it takes pilots to identify hazards, make decisions, and
perform the most optimal and safe flight operations.
In Relating Flight Experience and Pilots’ Perceptions of
Decision-Making Skill, Goh and Wiegmann (2002b) report that
Recognizing the weather has changed does not imply a pilot will generate the most optimal plan to
deal with it. Being able to diagnose how serious this
weather change is and the options available given
the constraints of the situation (e.g., the weather
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change precludes the option of returning to the origin), are highly important. Therefore, in the event
that a pilot encounters situations that are not easily defined in emergency procedures (e.g., inadvertently encountering adverse weather), the pilot will
need to rely on his or her own abilities to diagnose
the problem quickly and accurately. (p. 84)
This study reinforces the importance of a pilot’s confidence, and independence from weather automation, to perceive
danger and act accordingly. While automated weather aids assist pilots in identifying severe weather and route planning, the
weather data are limited. Thus, it is important that pilots retain a
crucial amount of skill, allowing for flight operations independent
of automated weather displays. Such abilities will assist a pilot to,
first, identify dangerous weather conditions, and then to act accordingly, with accuracy and speed.
Correlating to pilot decision-making in severe weather
conditions, Krozel, Penny, Prete, and Mitchell (2007) examine
the influence weather automation has on optimal planning
in the transition airspace during weather related events. This
study examined three automated route generators for weather
avoidance: navigation aids (Navaids), flow-based route planners,
and free-flights. The Navaids examined in this study were used
to determine standard terminal arrival routes (STARs). The flowbased route planners provide a set of routes that minimize the
distance traveled. Free-flights are generated to avoid weather
and separate other en-route aircraft, using the safest path within a
two-hundred nautical mile range. They state that “compared with
today’s routing practices, these methods demonstrate improved
throughput with increased safety during hazardous weather events
in the transition airspace” (Krozel et al., p. 152). This statement
suggests the reliability and positive effects automated systems can
have when aiming to avoid or fly through severe weather. Yet they
note that
Flow-based techniques are less computationally
intensive, as a single synthesized route may apply
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to many aircraft. A controlled version of free-flight
(using required times of arrival for aircraft) can
perform on par with the highest performing flowbased techniques. However, free-flight requires
routes to be generated for each aircraft that simultaneously avoid hazardous weather and aircraft
conflicts, therefore requiring great computational
time. Further, free-flight techniques exhibit greater
complexity than flow-based techniques, and therefore imply greater workload to monitor. (p. 152)
While all three of these automated methods of severe
weather avoidance provide safe and efficient routes within the airspace, some methods are quicker and more efficient than others.
Studies such as this are vitally important in determining the best
form of weather automation systems to be implemented within the
cockpit. As it is the industry’s goal to develop and implement the
most proficient and accessible automation for flight operations, improving the performance of both pilot and the automation will provide insight about the most appropriate automated weather systems.
Madhavan and Lacson (2006) discuss the effects of automation on pilot decision-making in their study “Psychological Factors Affecting Pilots’ Decision to Navigate in Deteriorating Weather.” This study identifies the influences of automated systems on
pilot decision-making in high-risk situations. These technologies
improve, speed up, and at times fully complete flight operations
and decision-making situations for pilots. It is reported that
Higher levels of automation may be beneficial
in situations where it is extremely difficult or
even impossible for the pilot to independently assess the overall state of the system (in this case
the aircraft in critically deteriorating weather
conditions)… These automated systems assist,
support or even perform the last stages of decision-making for the pilot, namely functions as-

14

The Influence of Cockpit Weather Automation on Pilot Perception
and Decision-Making in Severe Weather Conditions

sociated with risk assessment, decision-making
and action selection… Decision-making models can help determine the causes of VFR into
IMC incidents by delineating the variables that
typically affect quality of decisions at various
stages of the navigating process. Consequently,
solutions to improve pilot decision-making can
be found through cognitive aspects of training,
displays allow for easy detection and integration of cues, as well as automated tools to assess and formulate courses of action. (p. 58-59)
This study shows that automated decision-making yields
difficulties in determining probable causes in aviation accidents,
supports pilots in making decisions, and at times completes flight
operations for the pilot, providing pilots with information pertaining to flight operations, and in some cases preventing aircraft accidents by decreasing the time needed in the decision-making process. Such yields are most beneficial in high-risk situations with
an absolute need for automated weather aids.

CONCLUSION
Too much or too little attention given to automated
weather aids may prevent a pilot from recognizing the severity of
weather conditions and choosing the best response to the situation.
This research concludes that the influence of weather automation
on pilot perception and decision-making, whether it is positive
or negative, is significantly dependent upon the pilot’s training
and flight experience. For the best performance and completion of
cognitive tasks in severe weather, there must be a balance between
a pilot’s knowledge of flight operations, ability to complete flight
operations and a pilot’s reliance upon weather automation. Safer
decision-making and high performance between pilots and automated weather systems will help reduce erroneous behavior and,
ultimately, aircraft accidents.
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